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This paper considers a nonlinear pricing framework with both horizontally and
vertically differentiated products. By endogenizing the set of consumers served
in the market, we are able to study how increased competition affects nonlinear
pricing, in particular the market coverage and quality distortions. We character-
ize the symmetric equilibrium menu of price–quality offers under different mar-
ket structures. When the market structure moves from monopoly to duopoly, we
show that more types of consumers are served and quality distortions decrease.
As the market structure becomes more competitive, the effect of increased com-
petition exhibits some non-monotonic features: when the initial competition is
not too weak, a further increase in the number of ﬁrms leads to more types of
consumers being covered and a reduction in quality distortions; when the initial
competition is weak, an increase in the number of ﬁrms leads to fewer types of
consumers being covered, though the effect on quality distortions is not uniform.
Keywords. Nonlinear pricing, product differentiation, market coverage, quality
distortions.
JEL classification. D40, D82, L10.
1. Introduction
Since the work of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) on monopolistic
nonlinear pricing, there has been a growing literature on nonlinear pricing in competi-
tive settings (see, for example, Spulber 1989, Champsaur and Rochet 1989, Wilson 1993,
Gilbert and Matutes 1993, Stole 1995, Verboven 1999, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr
1999, Armstrong and Vickers 2001, 2006, Rochet and Stole 1997, 2002, and Ellison 2005).
However, much remains to be done to understand how increased competition affects
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ﬁrms’ nonlinear pricing strategies. In this paper, we focus on the effects of increased
(horizontal) competition on the (vertical) market coverage and quality distortions. In
doing so our paper is most closely related to Rochet and Stole (1997, 2002), to which it is
complementary.
Rochet and Stole (1997) study duopoly nonlinear pricing in a standard Hotelling
model in which the horizontal types of consumers are distributed uniformly over [0,]
and the vertical types of consumers are distributed uniformly over [,], where / is
larger than some value approximately equal to 0.76. Their main results are as follows.
When the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufﬁciently large (¾m) so that each
ﬁrm is in effect a local monopoly, the equilibrium exhibits perfect sorting, with quality
distortions for all types but the top () and the bottom (). When the degree of horizon-
taldifferentiationissufﬁcientlylow(c),themarketisfullycoveredonbothvertical
and horizontal dimensions, each ﬁrm offers a cost-plus-fee pricing schedule, and qual-
ity provision is fully efﬁcient for all the types. Finally, when m >  > c, competition
in nonlinear schedules yield a mixed regime consisting of both the local monopoly re-
gion and the competitive region. The equilibrium exhibits perfect sorting with quality
distortions for all but  and .
The analysis in Rochet and Stole (2002) is more general, as it covers both monopoly
and duopoly cases, and allows for general distributions for horizontal types of con-
sumers (though vertical types are still assumed to be uniformly distributed). These hor-
izontal types are interpreted as outside opportunity costs, which give rise to random
participation by consumers. By taking random participation into account, they show
that in the monopoly case there is either bunching or no quality distortion at the bot-
tom. In the duopoly case, they show that under full market coverage, quality distortions
disappear and the equilibrium is characterized by the cost-plus-fee pricing feature (a
similar result is obtained in Armstrong and Vickers 2001).1 Both results are in stark con-
trast with thereceived wisdom in thenonlinear pricing literature (e.g., Mussaand Rosen
1978), where quality distortions occur for all types but  so as to reduce consumers’
informational rents.
It is worth noting that in both papers, Rochet and Stole’s analysis focuses on the case
where the market is always fully covered on the vertical dimension, that is, the lowest




we focus on the case where the lowest vertical type of consumer is typically excluded
from the market. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the vertical types of consumers are
distributed uniformly over [0,1]. This is a case not covered in Rochet and Stole because
the condition = 
1
2 is clearly violated. A direct consequence is that in our analysis,
the minimal (vertical) type of consumer being served in the market is endogenously
determined in equilibrium.
Interestingly, our ﬁndings are quite different from those in Rochet and Stole. In all
the cases we analyze, the equilibrium exhibits perfect sorting (bunching never occurs),
1RochetandStole(2002)focusseparatelyonthecompetitiveregimeandthemonopolyregime(interms
of consumer coverage in the horizontal dimension). The mixed regime with both regimes present is ana-
lyzed in Rochet and Stole (1997).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 125
and the quality distortion is maximal for the lowest type (we postpone a detailed dis-
cussion on the differences in our results from those of Rochet and Stole to Section 3).
In fact, our results are more in line with those obtained in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
Maskin and Riley (1984). More importantly, focusing on the case where the lowest type
of consumers being served is endogenously determined allows us to study the effect of
varying horizontal differentiation (competition) on the market coverage, which is the
main motivation of this paper. Our model is thus an extension of Rochet and Stole and
our analysis complements that of Rochet and Stole.
The key to our analysis comes from the interaction between horizontal differentia-
tion (competition) and screening on the vertical dimension. Although horizontal differ-
entiation does not have a direct impacton the incentive compatibility (IC) conditions in
the vertical dimension, it affects the IC conditions through the rent provisions to con-
sumers.2 This interaction in turn affects the menu of price–quality offers made by each
brand (ﬁrm). It is through this interaction that we identify the effect of increased (hori-
zontal) competition on the (vertical) market coverage of each ﬁrm.
Note that the interaction between the horizontal differentiation (competition) and
screening in the vertical dimension is also present, though not explicitly mentioned, in
Rochet and Stole. However, since the lowest (vertical) type covered is ﬁxed, this inter-
action does not have an effect on market coverage in the vertical dimension in their
model. On the other hand, since the lowest vertical type is endogenously determined in
our model, there is one additional “freedom” for the working of this interaction: it now
also affects market coverage in the vertical dimension.
Our base model includes both the monopoly and duopoly cases. In the duopoly
case, there are two horizontally differentiated brands owned and operated by two sepa-
rateﬁrms. Inthemonopolycase,weassumethattheelementsofthemodelarethesame
as in the duopoly case except that the two brands are owned and operated by a single
ﬁrm,themonopolist. Thisparticularwayofmodelingprovidesawell-controlledbench-
mark;thedifferenceinmarketstructuresistheonlydifferencebetweentheduopolyand
monopoly cases. We focus on symmetric equilibria in which each ﬁrm (brand) makes
the same menu of price–quality offers, and characterize the equilibrium menu of price–
quality offers for both monopoly and duopoly. In both cases, the equilibrium menu of
price–quality offers is unique, and a positive measure of consumers is excluded from
the market. Moreover, the equilibrium price–quality offers in both cases exhibit perfect
sorting.
Compared to the monopoly benchmark, we show that under duopoly more con-
sumer types are covered and quality distortions decrease. This result is due to the inter-
action between horizontal competition and vertical screening. Intuitively, the competi-
tion in duopoly increases the rent provisions for higher type consumers, which relaxes
the screening condition in the vertical dimension (informational rent consideration be-
comes less important, as higher type consumers obtain higher rent anyway due to com-
petition). This leads to consumer types who were previously excluded being served in
the market, and a reduction in quality distortions.
2As is standard in the screening literature, any IC contract can be represented by a rent provision sched-
ule, which governs the utilities of consumers in equilibrium.126 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Westudyalsohowthedegreeofhorizontaldifferentiation,ortheintensityofcompe-
tition, affects the equilibrium menu of offers. It turns out that the effects under the two
market structures are quite different. Under monopoly, as the two brands become less
differentiated, fewer consumer types are covered by each brand, and quality distortions
becomelarger. Theeffectsintheduopolycasearesubtle. Whenthedegreeofhorizontal
differentiation(capturedbythetransportationcostk)issmallerthansomecutoffvalue,
a decrease in k results in more consumer types being served and smaller quality distor-
tions; when k is larger than the cutoff value, a decrease in k results in fewer consumer
types being served, and the effect on quality distortions is not uniform. Again these re-
sultsaredrivenbytheinterplaybetweenthehorizontaldifferentiationandscreeningon
the vertical dimension.
Finally, we extend our analysis of the duopoly model to a ﬁnite n-ﬁrm case and
demonstratethattheanalysiscanbetranslatedintothatoftheduopolymodelbyproper
normalization. We show that an increase in the number of ﬁrms is equivalent to a de-
crease in k in the duopoly model. We thus conclude that when the initial competition
level is not too low (n is large), an increase in the number of ﬁrms results in more con-
sumer types being served by each ﬁrm and smaller quality distortions, while when the
initial competition level is low (n is small), an increase in the number of ﬁrms results in
fewerconsumertypesbeingservedbyeachﬁrm,thoughtheeffectonqualitydistortions
is not uniform.
A number of other papers also study nonlinear pricing in competitive settings with
both horizontally and vertically differentiated products—see, for example, Gilbert and
Matutes (1993), Stole (1995), Verboven (1999), Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999), El-
lison (2005), and Armstrong and Vickers (2001, 2006). However, these papers assume
that all consumer types in the vertical dimension are served in the market. This full cov-
erage assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, but precludes the effect of competition
on consumer coverage in the vertical dimension, which is central to our analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the base model with two
brands. Section 3 derives the optimal symmetric menu of price–quality offers under
monopoly. Section 4 characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in the duopoly model,
and investigates how the equilibrium changes as the market structure moves from
monopoly to duopoly. We extend our analysis to the arbitrary n-ﬁrm case in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses the robustness of our analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a market with both vertically and horizontally differentiated products
where consumers’ preferences differ in two dimensions. In the horizontal dimension,
consumers have different tastes over different brands (ﬁrms), while in the vertical di-
mension consumers have different marginal utilities over quality.3 Although neither
3For example, the wholesale market for ﬂat white cotton bed sheets of a particular size ﬁts into this
framework. Thread count would be the vertical attribute and the country of origin would be the horizontal
attribute. Sellers are ﬁrms located in a single country, and buyers are brand-name distributors and depart-
mentstoreswithhousebrands. Seehttp://www.tradekey.com/ks-bed-sheetformoredetailsofthismarket.







Figure 1. A two-brand base model.
type is observable to ﬁrms, in our model the single-crossing property is satisﬁed only
in the vertical dimension. As a result ﬁrms can make offers to sort consumers only with
respect to their vertical types.4
Our basic model studies the two-brand case under both duopoly and monopoly
market structures. Under duopoly, two ﬁrms own two distinct brands, brand 1 and
brand 2, respectively. Each ﬁrm (brand) offers a variety of vertically differentiated prod-
ucts, that is, goods of different qualities, which are indexed by q, q 2 R+.5 Quality q is
both observable and contractible.
There is a continuum of consumers in the market, whose preferences differ on two
dimensions: the “taste” dimension over the brands and the “quality” dimension. We
model the taste dimension as the horizontal “location” of a consumer on a unit-length
circle representing the ideal brand for that consumer.6 As depicted in Figure 1, the loca-
tions of brands1 and 2 evenly split the circle. Let di be the distance between a con-
sumer’s location and brand i’s location. Then di is this consumer’s horizontal type,
i = 1,2. Because d1 + d2 =
1
2, either d1 or d2 alone fully captures a consumer’s pref-
erence over the two brands.
The consumers’ varying preferences over the quality dimension are captured by ,
 2 [0,1], which we call a consumer’s vertical type. A consumer is thus characterized
by a two-dimensional type (di,) (either i = 1 or i = 2). Neither  or di is observable
by either ﬁrm. We assume that consumers are uniformly located along the unit-length
circle, and the vertical types of consumers at each location are distributed uniformly
over the unit interval:  U[0,1]. A consumer’s horizontal location and vertical type are
independent.
4For this reason our paper does not belong to the multi-dimensional screening literature (e.g., Laffont
et al. 1987, McAfee and McMillan 1988, Armstrong 1996, and Rochet and Choné 1998).
5Throughout “quality” should be interpreted as a summary measure for a variety of product character-
isitics, such as safety, reliability, and durability.
6For two brands, it is sufﬁcient to use a unit interval. We work with a unit-length circle since doing so
makes it easier to extend our model to the arbitrary n-brand or n-ﬁrm case later.128 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Each consumer demands at most one unit of a good. If a type-(di,) consumer
purchases one unit of the brand-i product with quality q at price t, her utility is given
by
u(q,t,di,)=q  t  kdi (1)
where k, k > 0, can be interpreted as the per unit “transportation” cost. Note that the
smaller is k, the less horizontally differentiated are the two brands. The reservation
utility of a consumer who purchases no product is normalized to be 0.
We assume that the two brands (ﬁrms) have the same production technology.
Speciﬁcally,toproduceaunitofquality-q productaﬁrmincursacostc(q)=q2=2. Thus,
each ﬁrm (brand) has a per-customer proﬁt function given by
(t,q)=t  q2=2. (2)
Each ﬁrm makes a menu of price–quality offers, which is a collection of price and
quality pairs. Given the menus of price–quality offers made by both ﬁrms (brands), con-
sumers decide whether to make a purchase, and if so, which brand to choose and which
offer to accept. It is well known that in the environment of competitive nonlinear pric-
ing, it is no longer without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct contracts.7 To
sidestepthisproblem,asinRochetandStole(2002)werestrictattentiontodeterministic
contracts.8 Since the preferences of a consumer with vertical type  over the available
price–quality pairs conditional on purchasing from a ﬁrm (brand) are independent of
her horizontal type di, in what follows it is without loss of generality to consider direct
contracts (offers) of the form fq(),t()g2[0,1]. For brevity of exposition, we often refer
to vertical types simple as types, especially when there is no confusion in the context.
Our solution concept is Bertrand–Nash equilibrium: given the other ﬁrm’s menu of
offers, each ﬁrm’s menu of offers maximizes its expected total proﬁt.
This basically completes a description of the duopoly model. For the monopoly
model, our main goal is to lay down a benchmark with which we can identify the ef-
fect of competition on the menu of offers. As such in the monopoly model we need to
control for all but the market structure. We thus assume that in the monopoly case, all
the elements of the model are the same as in the duopoly model, except that the two
brands are now owned and operated by the same ﬁrm, which is the monopolist.9 The
7As demonstrated in a series of examples in Martimort and Stole (1997) and Peck (1997), equilibrium
outcomes in indirect mechanisms may not be supported when sellers are restricted to using direct mech-
anisms where buyers report only their private types. Moreover, as demonstrated by Martimort and Stole
(1997), an equilibrium in such direct mechanisms may not be robust to the possibility that sellers might
deviate to more complicated mechanisms. The reason for such failures, as pointed out by McAfee (1993)
and Katz (1991), is that in competition with nonlinear pricing the offers made by other ﬁrms may also be
the private information of the consumers when they make their purchase decisions, which means that this
private information can also potentially be used when ﬁrms set up their revelation mechanisms.
8See Rochet and Stole (2002) for a discussion of the restrictions resulting from focusing on deterministic
contracts. More general approaches to restoring the “without loss of generality” implication of the reve-
lation principle in the environment of competitive nonlinear pricing are proposed and developed by, for
example, Epstein and Peters (1999), Peters (2001), and Page and Monteiro (2003).
9So our benchmark is a multi-product monopoly, which has an alternative interpretation as being a
collusive duopoly.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 129
monopolist’s objective is to maximize the joint proﬁts from the two brands by choosing
the menu of offers for each brand.
As an analytical benchmark, given (1) and (2), the ﬁrst-best (efﬁcient) quality provi-
sion is q() = . We can thus deﬁne   q() as the quality distortion for type  given
the quality schedule q.
Incentive compatible price-quality offers
Let Ui(^ ,,di) be the utility obtained by a consumer of type (,di) who reports ^  and
purchases a unit of brand i’s product. Then
Ui(^ ,,di)=qi(^ ) ti(^ ) kdi. (3)
Incentive compatibility requires
8(, ^ )2[0,1]2, Ui(,,di)Ui(^ ,,di) for i =1,2. (4)
Since(3)satisﬁesthesingle-crossingpropertyin(,qi), wecanshowthefollowing“con-
straint simpliﬁcation” lemma.





qi()d kdi for all  
i and i =1,2
(ii) qi() is increasing in 
where 
i 2[0,1) is the lowest type that purchases from brand i.
Lemma 1 is a standard result in the one-dimensional screening literature. This also
applies to our model because the consumers’ utility functions are separable inq and di.
Here 
i can be regarded as a separate choice variable for brand i: any consumer whose
type is below 
i is excluded from the market for brand i. Alternatively, one can think of







qi()d, i =1,2. (5)
ThenbyLemma1, yi()istherentprovisiontothetype-(,0)consumerspeciﬁedbythe
menu of IC offers made by brand i. The equilibrium utility enjoyed by a consumer of
type (,di) can now be written as yi() kdi. Moreover, the quality and price speciﬁed
in the original offer can be recovered from yi() as follows:
qi()=y 0
i() and ti()=qi() yi().
Thus any menu of IC offers can be characterized by the rent provision schedules (yi,
i =1,2).10
10In this regard we follow the lead of Armstrong and Vickers (2001), who model ﬁrms as supplying utility




















Figure 2. An illustration of market shares and market coverage.
Individual rationality and market shares
Givenrentprovisionschedulesfyi()g,i =1,2,eachconsumerdecideswhethertomake
a purchase, and if he does, what product (brand and quality) to purchase. If a consumer






















The number 2si() is the total measure of type- consumers who purchase brand i
products. Figure 2 illustrates one half of the market share for each brand (the other
half not shown is symmetric).
From Figure 2, we can see that there is a cutoff type ^  above which the market is
fully covered (consumers are served regardless of their horizontal locations), and below
which the market is not fully covered. This is because yi() is increasing in  by (5).
Under duopoly, the full coverage range [^ ,1] can also be called the competition range
sincethetwoﬁrmsarecompetingforcustomersoverthisrange,andthepartialcoverage
range [
i , ^ ) can also be called the local monopoly range. Note that ^  is endogenously





















si()d. (7)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 131
By separating the partial coverage range from the full coverage range, we can rewrite (7)
































The maximization of (8) subject to the transition equation y 0
i() = qi() and the
corresponding endpoint conditions can be viewed as an optimal control problem with
two potential phases.11 What makes it different from an ordinary single-phase optimal
control problem is that now we need to solve also for the optimal switching “time” ^ , at
which the ﬁrst phase switches to the second phase.
3. Monopoly
Under monopoly, the two brands are owned by a single ﬁrm. The monopolist’s objec-
tive is to maximize the joint proﬁt from the two brands. Since consumers are uniformly
distributed along the horizontal dimension and the two brands’ production technolo-
gies are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric solution in which each brand makes the
same menu of offers and the resulting market shares are symmetric.12 We can thus drop





























where  is the lowest type of consumer served, that is, y() = 0,13 and ^  is the unique
solution to y()=k =
1
4.
As is standard in the literature, we solve the relaxed program by dropping the con-
straint q0()  0 (the monotonicity of q() is veriﬁed later to justify this approach).
11An early application of the two-phase optimal control technique can be found in Amit (1986), who
considers a petroleum recovery process that has two potential phases with different technologies yielding
different extraction rates.
12Wefocusonthesymmetricsolutionhereforeaseofcomparisonwiththeduopolycase, wherewefocus
on symmetric equilibrium in which each ﬁrm makes the same menu of offers. While a formal proof is not
attempted here, we conjecture that any optimal solution for the monopolist is symmetric.
13If y( ) > 0, then for some sufﬁciently small , it can be veriﬁed that some type-(    ) consumers
prefer accepting the offer y( ) to staying out of the market, which contradicts the assumption that   is
the lowest type being served.132 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)

















4 +q if ^  < 1.




2y 02  yy 00 =0. (9)
Given the lower endpoint condition y()=0, it can be veriﬁed that the unique solution







y 00 =2 . Combined with the transversality condition (1)=0, the solution to this system
is given by
y()=2   +, q()=2  1,
where isaparameteryettobedetermined. Notethatinbothphasesq()isincreasing
in . Thus the solutions to the relaxed program are also the solutions to the original
program. Moreover, since in both phases q() is strictly increasing in , the optimal
menu of offers exhibits perfect sorting.
To determine ^ , we apply smooth pasting: y(^  ) = y(^ +) and q(^  ) = q(^ +).15 We
thus have
3




2(^   )=2^   1.




















It is easily veriﬁed that ^  has an interior solution only when k <
4
3. If k ¾
4
3, we have
the corner solution ^  = 1. That is, if k ¾
4
3 phase II is never entered (there is no inter-
action between the two brands). In that case we can use the transversality condition,
(1)=0, to pin down M =
1
3. The above analysis is summarized in the next result.
14The uniqueness is implied in Rochet and Stole (2002, appendix, p. 304): if a convex solution to the
differential equation (9) exists for a given set of boundary conditions, it is unique.
15Smooth pasting is a consequence of the Weierstrass–Erdmann necessary condition.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 133
Proposition 1. In the monopoly model, the optimal symmetric menu of offers is unique















16k if ^ M < 1,
















The optimal menu of offers exhibits several salient features. First, there is always a
positive measure of types of consumers (regardless of the horizontal location) who are
excluded from the market (M > 0). The underlying reason for the exclusion involves
a consideration of the informational rent. Making offers to all types may increase the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt from types in [0,M). However, doing so necessarily increases the infor-
mational rent to all types above M due to the screening condition (5), which reduces
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt from those types. The optimal M, which balances these two opposing
effects, should thus be strictly positive. Second, there is quality distortion for all but the
highest type consumers, i.e., q() <  for all  2 [M,1). This is again driven by the
informational rent. Finally, the optimal offers exhibit perfect sorting. That is, different
types of consumers choose different offers. Our results thus imply that bunching does
notoccurandthequalityprovisionforthelowesttypecoveredisalwaysdistorteddown-
wards. These are very different from the results obtained by Rochet and Stole (1997,
2002), who show that either bunching occurs at a lower interval, or perfect sorting oc-
curs with efﬁcient quality provision for the lowest type.
This difference between our results and theirs at ﬁrst appears puzzling, given that
the differential equation (9) is either the same as the one characterized in the monop-
olistic regime of Rochet and Stole (1997) or a special case of the Euler equation in the
monopolycaseofRochetandStole(2002). Thekeytosolvingthepuzzleistoobservethe
difference in boundary conditions. Note that the ratio of the lowest type to the highest
type  = = is assumed to be greater than 0.76 in Rochet and Stole (1997) and greater
than 0.5 in Rochet and Stole (2002). Both conditions imply that all the (vertical) types
are covered. As a result, the state variable y is free at the lowest type , which gives
rise to the boundary condition () = 0. Substituting this into the ﬁrst order condition
@ H1=@ q = 0 yields q() = . In other words, we have efﬁcient quality provision at the
bottom if the monotonicity constraint onq is satisﬁed (the perfect sorting case).16 Note
alsothatsortingcanbecomequitecostlyforthemonopolistgiventherequirementofno
qualitydistortionat, whichexplainswhybunchingmayoccuratalowerintervalstart-
ing from . On the other hand, in our model the lowest possible type  is 0 (=0), thus
not all types are covered and the lowest type covered, , is endogenously determined.
This leads to a different set of boundary conditions: y()=0 and H()=0. Combined
16This result of efﬁciency at the bottom does not hold in the discrete setting. In their appendix, Rochet
and Stole (2002) demonstrate that the distortion at the bottom decreases as the type space becomes ﬁner,
and completely disappears in the limit as  is distributed continuously.134 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
with the differential equation (9), these conditions pin down a unique perfect sorting
solution in which q()=0.17
Thus in a sense our analysis is complementary to that in Rochet and Stole: while
they study the case with full coverage of vertical types ( is big), we analyze the case
with endogenously determined coverage of vertical types ( is small). It is worth noting
that the two cases lead to qualitatively different results. To better understand the link
between our results and those of Rochet and Stole, ﬁx the upper bound of the vertical
type, , and assume that  is now distributed uniformly over [,]. First we ignore the
constraint  . Following exactly the same derivations that lead to Proposition 1, we






3k c. (If  c then the constraint   is not binding
and our approach is justiﬁed.) When  is 0, our results apply: there is an endogenously
determined lowest type covered, , with perfect sorting and q () = 0. This feature
stays the same until  is raised just above c. When  is just above c, the constraint
   is binding and the case of Rochet and Stole applies since all the vertical types
are covered.18 When  = c, if the monotonicity constraint does not bind, then the
boundary condition requires efﬁcient quality provision at .19 But continuity implies
that the optimal solution should not change drastically at  = c. Thus monotonicity
must fail, leading to bunching at the lower end near . Intuitively, when  is slightly
above c ( is relatively small), efﬁcient quality provision at  is costly since it increases
theinformationalrentforallhighertypes,themeasureofwhichisbigsinceisrelatively
small. Optimality thus requires bunching. As  is further raised close to  ( becomes
big enough), efﬁcient quality provision at  becomes less costly since there are fewer
higher types. As a result, the monotonicity constraint is more likely to be satisﬁed even
with efﬁcient quality provision at . Therefore, perfect sorting is more likely when 
is big. This, we believe, explains why in Rochet and Stole the solution involves perfect
sorting when  is sufﬁciently large.
We are interested in how the degree of horizontal differentiation, which is parame-
terized by k, affects the market coverage and quality distortions. Equation (10) shows
that for k 2 (0,
4




3 is independent of k.
Thus when two brands become more horizontally differentiated (bigger k), more con-
sumer types are served by the monopolist. From the equilibrium quality schedules it
can also be seen that quality distortions become smaller in Phase I but are unaffected in
Phase II. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the monopoly model, when two brands become more horizontally dif-
ferentiated, moreconsumertypesareservedandqualitydistortionsbecomesmallerinthe
partial coverage range and remain unaffected in the full coverage range.
17It can be easily veriﬁed that the quadratic functional form solution, which works in our case, does




2 as assumed in Rochet and Stole (2002), then  c is violated. In that case our approach
of ignoring the constraint     is not justiﬁed, and the solution may not be perfect sorting, which is
consistent with Rochet and Stole’s ﬁnding.
19This implies that lim
!+
c
q( )=c while lim
! 
c
q( )=0.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 135
To understand the intuition for this result, we ﬁrst need to understand the effects on
proﬁt of increasing the rent provision. Raising rent provisions (hence the total rent) to
consumers has two effects. The ﬁrst is to reduce the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability per consumer
(which can be termed the marginal effect), and the second is to attract more consumers
(which can be termed the market share effect). Thus proﬁt maximization requires an
optimal balance between these two opposing effects. Note that with asymmetric infor-
mation, the ﬁrm cannot freely vary the rent provision for certain types of consumers
without affecting the rent provisions to other types. That is, rent provisions can only be
adjusted subject to the screening condition, (5), which implies that changing the rent
provision for some type will affect the rent provisions for all the types above. Hence
the optimal rent provision schedule reﬂects an optimal trade-off between the marginal
effect and market share effect subject to the screening condition.
Inviewofthisinsight,itisnowstraightforwardtothinkthroughtheintuitionbehind
Proposition 2. As k increases, by ﬁxing the previous menu of offers (holding y ﬁxed), ^ 
increases and y()=k decreases, which implies that the market shares in both the full
and partial coverage ranges shrink. To counter this effect, the monopolist has an incen-
tive to increase y() in an attempt to partially restore the loss of the market shares. By
the screening condition (5), this can be achieved by either moving the schedule q up-
ward or pushing M downward, and both occur in equilibrium. Hence Proposition 2 is
driven by an interaction between horizontal differentiation and screening in the vertical
dimension, which occurs through the rent provision schedule y().
4. Duopoly
In the duopoly model, each ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its proﬁt by choosing a menu
of offers, given the other ﬁrm’s menu of offers. Since both ﬁrms are symmetric in terms
of their production technology and market positions, we focus on symmetric equilib-
rium, in which each ﬁrm makes the same menu of offers, hence the same rent provision
schedule y (),  2 [D,1] (D is the lowest type that is served in the market). For-
mally, the pair (y ,y ) constitutes a Bertrand–Nash equilibrium if given y i() = y (),
 2[,1], ﬁrm i’s best response is to choose yi()=y (),  2[,1], as well.
Given the two ﬁrms’ rent provision schedules y1() and y2(), the consumers’ type
space is demarcated into two ranges: the competition range ( > ^ ) and the local
monopoly range ( < ^ ). The switching point ^  is determined by yi(^ )=k=2 y i(^ ).
Suppose y i() = y (),  2 [,1]. Then ﬁrm i’s relaxed program (by ignoring the
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4 +(1=2k)(yi() y ())]+qi if ^  < 1.







For phase II ( > ^ ), the optimality condition and the costate equation evaluated at
























Letting yi = y i = y , the switching point ^  is deﬁned by y (^ ) =
1
4k. Applying smooth
pasting for both y  and q at ^ , we have ^    =
p
k=3. From the Phase I solution, we
can obtain y 0(^ )=q(^ )=
p
3k=2. Finally (1)=0 implies that y 0(1)=q(1)=1.
Now the existence of a symmetric equilibrium boils down to the existence of ^  2
(0,1] and a convex function y  deﬁned over [^ ,1] that satisfy the following equations
(we drop the superscripts to simplify notation):20
y 00 =2 (2=k)
 















, the duopoly model has a unique symmetric equilibrium,




4(  D)2 if D   ^ D
y () if ^ D  1,




















20We need y 00()¾0 to ensure q0()0.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 137







solution to the differential equation system (13) exists and is unique. Moreover, y () is
strictly convex. The system (13) is not a standard ordinary differential equation (ODE)
system partly due to the fact that the boundary conditions involve an endogenously
determined endpoint (^ ). Thus no existing ODE theorem can be directly applied to
show the existence and uniqueness of a solution. The proof is somewhat tedious and
hence relegated to the Appendix. It is clear that the system (13) has no closed-form
solution. So the schedule y () can be obtained only from numerical computations.
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) demonstrate that in a
market where consumers are fully covered on both horizontal and vertical dimensions,
there are no quality/quantity distortions by competing duopolists. The intuition seems
to be that the competitive pressure induces a type of Ramsey pricing by the ﬁrms, i.e.,
any inefﬁcient offer could be dominated by making a more efﬁcient offer along with a
more proﬁtable ﬁxed fee. Proposition 3, however, suggests that this conclusion is no
longer valid in a setting with partial market coverage. When the marginal utilities over
quality are sufﬁciently low for some consumers, each competing duopolist becomes a
local monopolist for those types. It thus becomes proﬁtable to exclude some of these
types from the market. This endogenously determined threshold then induces distor-
tions for many infra-marginal consumers.21
Let qD and qM be the equilibrium quality provision schedules in the duopoly model
and monopoly model, respectively. Despite the absence of a closed-form solution in the
duopoly model, we are able to rank D and M and the schedules qD and qM unam-
biguously.






we have D < M and qD() > qM() for  2 [D,1),
which implies that compared to the monopoly benchmark, more consumer types are
served by each ﬁrm, and quality distortions are smaller in duopoly equilibrium.
This result is proved in the Appendix. The result is shown by comparing the differ-
ential equation systems under the two market structures. Figure 3 compares the market
coverages under duopoly and monopoly. Since D < M and qD() >qM(), it is eas-
ily seen that yD() > yM(), which in turn implies that the market coverage area under
duopoly contains that under monopoly.
To see the intuition behind this comparison result, start by assuming that in the
duopoly case each ﬁrm makes the same optimal symmetric menu of offers as in the
monopoly case. As a result the partial coverage and full coverage ranges are the same
under both market structures. Note that in the full coverage range ( 2 [^ M,1]), the
market share effect is absent under monopoly since the market is fully covered and the
“competition” between the two brands is internalized by the monopolist; however, un-
der duopoly the market share effect is present since each ﬁrm (brand) tries to steal the
other ﬁrm’s market share. Thus the market share effect is stronger under duopoly, and
21Rochet and Stole (1997) have a similar ﬁnding in their analysis of the mixed regime, where consumers
are not fully covered along the horizontal dimension. However, the efﬁciency at the bottom () still persists
















Figure 3. Duopoly vs. Monopoly
each ﬁrm (brand) has an incentive to increase rent provision. Therefore moving from
monopoly to duopoly, D < M and qD() > qM() (by the screening condition (5)).
Another way to see this is that competition under duopoly increases rent provisions to
higher-type consumers (served in the full coverage range), which relaxes the screening
condition in the vertical dimension: under duopoly ﬁrms worry less about providing
additional (informational) rent for the higher-type consumers, as the higher-type con-
sumers are going to enjoy higher rent anyway due to competition. Consequently those
consumers not served under monopoly may be served under duopoly, and quality dis-
tortions become smaller.
Proposition 4 establishes that quality provision (q()) and market coverage are both
larger under duopoly. It is thus not clear whether the average quality of products is also
greater under duopoly. The answer is afﬁrmative as indicated by the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 5. Theaveragequalityofproductsofferedunderduopolyishigherthanthat







This result is proved in the Appendix. Intuitively speaking, competition leads to
higher average quality for the following reasons. First, in the partial coverage range
the average quality and the total measure of consumers covered are the same under
monopoly and duopoly. Second, in the full coverage range the average quality is higher
under duopoly since competition leads to smaller quality distortion. Finally, under
duopoly the full coverage range covers more consumers than it does under monopoly.
Since the average quality in the full coverage range is higher than that in the partial cov-
erage range, this also contributes to a higher (overall) average quality under duopoly.22
22It would be desirable to study the effect of competition on the prices. However, no general conclusion
can be drawn on this. For a offer that is targeted to a particular type, a direct effect of introducing com-Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 139















Figure 4. Comparison of participation thresholds.
Asinthemonopolycase,weareinterestedalsoinhowchangesink affectthemarket
coverage by each ﬁrm and the quality distortions. For convenience of comparison, we
show the schedules of both D and M against k in Figure 4, where the schedule of
D is plotted from numerical computation.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, M is always decreasing as k increases. But for the







, D is decreasing in k (for k 
4
3, D = M =
1
3 is independent of k).
Our computation shows that the turning point k is approximately 0.91. Note that the






is not quantitatively signiﬁcant; in this
range of k, D is in the range [0.33,0.35]. On the other hand, the increasing trend of
D in the range of (0,k) is quantitatively signiﬁcant; when k = k, D equals to 0.35,
while as k converges to 0, D converges to 0 as well. The following comparative statics
result is obtained from numerical computations.23
Proposition 6. Intheduopolycase, whenk 2(0,k), as k decreasesmoreconsumertypes







decreases fewer consumer types are covered by each ﬁrm, and the effect on quality distor-
tions is not uniform: there is a cutoff type, say e , such that when  2 [0, e ), quality dis-
tortions become bigger, while when  2 (e ,1), quality distortions become smaller; when
k ¾
4
3, both ﬁrms are local monopolists, hence k affects neither the market coverage nor
the quality distortions.
petition is to decrease the price. However, an indirect effect is that this type gets a higher quality under
competition, which tends to increase the price. The net effect is ambiguous.
23The MATLAB code for all the computations in this paper is available in a supplementary ﬁle on the
journal website, http://econtheory.org/supp/336/supplement.txt.140 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Thus the effects of changing k on  and quality distortions in the duopoly case are
dramatically different from those in the monopoly benchmark. The intuitions spelled
outpreviouslycontinuetohelp,thoughthedetailsareabitmoresubtle. Underduopoly,
a lower k implies not only less horizontal differentiation, but also more ﬁerce competi-
tion between the two ﬁrms.
A decrease in k while holding y ﬁxed leads to an increase in the market share in
Phase I (the local monopoly range). Following the intuition suggested for Proposition 2,
each ﬁrm then has an incentive to decrease the rent provision in this range, which can
be achieved by raising  or lowering q. However, the effect on Phase II (the compe-
tition range) is different. As k decreases, competition becomes more intense. As a re-
sult, the impact of the market share effect on the ﬁrms’ proﬁts becomes relatively more
important than that of the marginal effect on the ﬁrms’ proﬁt (which is further rein-
forced by a decrease in ^ ), therefore each ﬁrm has an incentive to raise rent provisions,
which can be achieved by lowering  or raising q. So the effects on  and q of de-
creasing k in the two phases work in opposite directions. The net effect depends on
which effect dominates.24 When k 2 (0,k), i.e., when the initial competition between
the two ﬁrms is not too weak, the competition range is more important relative to the
local monopoly range,25 thus the effect in the competition range dominates and more
consumer types are covered by each ﬁrm and quality distortions decrease in equilib-






, i.e., when the initial competition between
the two ﬁrms is weak, the local monopoly range is relatively more important,26 thus the
effect in the local monopoly range dominates and fewer consumer types are covered
by each ﬁrm, though the effect on quality distortions is not uniform: as k decreases,
there is a cutoff type, say e , such that when  2 [0, e ), q moves downward, while when







, competition is weak so the movement of the quality schedule should follow
the pattern in the monopoly case. This explains why as k decreases the quality sched-
uleinthelowertyperangemovesdownwardwhilethescheduleinthehighertyperange
remainsalmostunchanged—recallthatinthemonopolycase, ask decreasesthesched-
ule q in the partial coverage range moves downward, while it stays the same in the full
coverage range.
Again our computations show that the effect of changing k on either D or quality
distortions over the range k > k is not quantitatively signiﬁcant. However, it is quali-
tatively important as it provides a “continuity” for our intuitions to work when moving
from monopoly to duopoly.
5. Extension to n firms
In this section we extend our analysis to any arbitrary ﬁnite number n of ﬁrms. Speciﬁ-
cally, in the horizontal dimension there are n brands owned and operated by n distinct
24In terms of the rent provision schedule y, a decrease in k tends to increase y() in the competition
range and decrease y() in the local monopoly range. But y has to be continuous at the junction of two
ranges to satisfy the IC constraint.
25In the limit as k !0, the local monopoly range disappears.
26Whenk ¾
4
3,thecompetitionrangedisappearsandbothﬁrmsbehaveasiftheywerelocalmonopolists.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 141
ﬁrms (n  2), the locations of which evenly split the unit circle; and each ﬁrm offers
vertically differentiated products. Each ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the proﬁt from
its own brand, given the other ﬁrms’ menus of offers. Again we look for symmetric
Bertrand–Nash equilibria in which each ﬁrm makes the same menu of offers.27 An n-
tuple (y ,...,y ) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if, given that all other ﬁrms offer
y () for  2[,1], each ﬁrm’s best response is also to choose yi()=y (),  2[,1].
Given that all ﬁrms other than ﬁrm i offer the schedule y (),  2 [,1], it can be


































 y (^ ), ^  free, yi(1) free.
Following an analysis parallel to that in the previous section, we can demonstrate
that ﬁrm i’s equilibrium rent provision y () in the local monopoly range ( < ^ ) is
the same as that in the duopoly model which is independent of n. The equilibrium
rent provision in the competition range ( > ^ ) and the optimal switching point ^  are













If we deﬁne k0 = k=n as the normalized degree of horizontal differentiation, then
by inspection, in terms of k0 the differential equation system (14) is exactly the same as
the differential equation system (13) in the duopoly case (where k0 = k=2). This implies
that the analysis of the n-ﬁrm case can be translated into the analysis of the duopoly
case through normalizing k by n, and in terms of k0 the solution to the n-ﬁrm model
is the same as the solution to the duopoly model. Thus all the results from the duopoly
model carry over to the n-ﬁrm competitive model. In particular, the n-ﬁrm competitive
model has a unique symmetric equilibrium, and this equilibrium exhibits perfect sort-
ing, hence the participation threshold  becomes a measure for the market coverage of
27As a direct consequence each ﬁrm is effectively competing with two adjacent ﬁrms, a common feature
implied by the Salop model.142 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
each ﬁrm.28 Moreover, the effect of an increase in n (while holding k ﬁxed) on the equi-
librium is exactly the same as the effect of a decrease in k on the duopoly equilibrium.
To re-state the results in the duopoly case in terms of k0, deﬁne k0 = k=2 t .455. Then
as k0 increases, for k0 < k0,  increases and q decreases, for k0 < k0 <
2
3,  decreases
while q increases for lower types but decreases for higher types, and for k0 
2
3, both 
and q are independent of k0. Translating this into n-ﬁrm case, we have the following
result.
Proposition 7. Fix k > 0 and deﬁne n = k=k0. When n > n, an increase in n leads
to more consumer types being served by each ﬁrm and smaller quality distortions; when
n 2 (1.5k,n), an increase in n leads to fewer consumer types being served by each ﬁrm
and larger quality distortions for lower types and smaller quality distortions for higher
types; when n  1.5k, each ﬁrm is a local monopolist, hence the market coverage and
quality distortions are independent of n.
This result implies that the effect of increasing competition on market coverage or
quality distortions depends on the initial state of competition, and that the effect is not
monotonic.
Our two-brand monopoly can be extended to ann-brand multi-product monopoly
by a similar normalization. Thus Proposition 2 can be extended to imply that as a mo-
nopolist offers more brands, fewer consumer types are covered by each brand. So for
a multi-product monopolist, horizontal brand variety and vertical market coverage are
substitutes.
6. Discussion
One main restriction in our preceding analysis is that we assume uniform distributions
for consumer types. While maintaining this assumption is mainly for ease of equilib-
rium analysis, it is not entirely clear whether our main results hold also for other distri-
butions. We now address this robustness issue.
Suppose consumer (vertical) types are distributed according to a CDF F over [0,1]
with density function f , where f () > 0 for all  2 [0,1].29 Following derivations similar
to those in Section 3, it can be veriﬁed that under monopoly, Phase I (partial coverage
range) is characterized by the differential equation
3y  
1
2y 02  yy 00 +
f 0
f
y(  y 0)=0 (15)
28In Gal-Or’s (1983) quantity-setting model, symmetric Cournot equilibria may exist when the number
of ﬁrms is small, but may fail to exist as the number of ﬁrms becomes larger. In contrast, in our model a
symmetric Bertand–Nash equilibrium always exists and is unique.
29We continue to assume that consumers’ horizontal types are uniformly distributed for two reasons.
First, this is standard in the Hotelling–Salop model. Second, a non-uniform distribution necessarily leads
to asymmetric equilibria, which are too difﬁcult to characterize. Note that Rochet and Stole (2002) allow
for a general distribution for horizontal types because their focus is on consumers’ random participation.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 143
with endpoint conditions y() = 0 and y(^ ) = k=4. Similarly, Phase II (full coverage





which can be further reduced to30




Thus forq() to be strictly increasing (perfect sorting) over [^ ,1], a sufﬁcient condi-
tion is that the hazard rate function of F() be increasing.
Now following derivations similar to those in Section 4, it can be veriﬁed that under
duopoly, Phase I (local monopoly range) is characterized by the differential equation
3y  
1




with endpoint conditions y() = 0 and y(^ ) = k=4 (which is the same as in the












By working with some speciﬁc distribution functions (e.g. the truncated exponen-
tial or generalized uniform distributions), it is clear that there is no analytical solution
to either the monopoly or the duopoly differential equation system. Thus an analytical
solution is generally unavailable for general distribution functions. The reduced order
technique introduced in the proof of Proposition 3 (and in Rochet and Stole) cannot be
applied to simplify the differential equations either. We thus turn to numerical compu-
tations to characterize the equilibrium given speciﬁc distributions.
We ﬁrst work with the case in which f () = e=(e   1) for  2 [0,1] (a truncated
exponential distribution). Our computation shows that the equilibrium exhibits perfect
sorting under both monopoly and duopoly. The schedule q() for the case k = 0.4 and
the whole schedule (k) under both monopoly and duopoly are depicted in Figure 5.
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, M is always decreasing as k increases. But for the







, D is decreasing in k (for k 
4
3, D = M is independent of k). Our com-
putation shows that the turning point k is approximately 0.90. The decreasing trend of






is not quantitatively signiﬁcant; however, the increasing trend
of D in the range (0,k) is quantitatively signiﬁcant. This pattern is very similar to the
one derived for the uniform distribution case (Figure 4). So all the results demonstrated
from the uniform distribution also carry over to this (truncated) exponential distribu-
tion case. We also examine a generalized uniform distribution f () = 2 for  2 [0,1].
30Deﬁne K  f ()( y 0)+
R 
0 f (s)ds. Inlightof(15)itcanbeveriﬁedthat K 0 =0. Theconditiony 0(1)=1
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Figure 5. The exponential distribution case.
Again our computation shows that the equilibrium exhibits perfect sorting under both
monopoly and duopoly. The schedule q() for the case k = 0.3 and the whole schedule
(k) under both monopoly and duopoly are depicted in Figure 6.
The comparison is, once again, qualitatively not different from the case of the uni-
formdistribution. Infact,forallthecases(withincreasinghazardratefunctions)thatwe
havecomputed,thecomparisonsbetweentheschedulesD(k)andM(k)arequalita-
tively the same as those obtained in the uniform distribution case. We thus believe that
the results derived from our main model are fairly robust, and our focus on the uniform
distribution is primarily for ease of equilibrium characterization.
7. Conclusion
In this paperwe extend the analysis ofRochet and Stole (1997, 2002)by considering par-
tial coverage of consumer types on the vertical dimension in a market with both verti-
cally and horizontally differentiated products. In each market structure that we analyze,
the equilibrium exhibits perfect sorting (bunching never occurs), and the quality dis-
tortion is maximal for the lowest type. Our results are thus quite different from those
obtained by Rochet and Stole (1997, 2002).
By focusing on the case where the lowest type of consumers being served is endoge-
nously determined, we are able to study also the effect of varying horizontal differenti-
ation (competition) on vertical market coverage and quality distortions. When moving
from monopoly to duopoly, more consumer types are covered by each brand (ﬁrm), and
the quality distortions become smaller. As the market structure becomes more compet-
itive, the effect of increased competition exhibits some non-monotonic features: when
the initial competition is not too weak, a further increase in the number of ﬁrms leads
to more types of consumers being served and a reduction in quality distortions; when
the initial competition is weak, an increase in the number of ﬁrms leads to fewer types
of consumers being served, though the effect on quality distortions is not uniform.
For tractability reasons we assume uniform distributions for consumer types in
our main analysis. However, the driving force behind our results, i.e., the interactionTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 145
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Figure 6. The generalized uniform distribution case.
between horizontal differentiation (competition) and screening on the vertical dimen-
sion, is fairly robust and is not restricted to speciﬁc distributions. Our results about the
effect of competition on market coverage and quality distortions have testable implica-
tions, which are left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Following the derivations preceding the proposition, the






there is a unique ^  2 (0,1] and a
unique y() deﬁned over [^ ,1] satisfying the differential equation system (13). More-
















Substituting w(z)=v2(z) into (17), we have w 0  2w=k =2+4z=k, which leads to
w(z)=ce2z=k  2z  2k,
where c is a parameter to be determined by the boundary conditions.












3k   ^ 
z0(1)=0.
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Letting f (u)=(eu  1) u +, where  = 
2
k ^ z  2, we have u 02 =4f (u)=k.






















u(^ )=0:= ^ u (20)
u 0(^ )=
p














For notational convenience let u1 =:u(1). Then u 0
1 =0) f (u1)=0.
From (21)–(22) it can be veriﬁed that ^  = 1 ) k =
4







^  <1, or  <2=
p
3k.
The rest of the proof consists of six steps.




f (u) and  ¾1.




f (u)  0. By (21),   1 and  
7
4, which
imply f 0(u) = eu  1 
7
4  1 > 0 for all u  0. But then f (u1) > f (^ u) = f (0) =   0, a




f (u)  0 and hence  ¾ 1. Since






, u1 = ^ u = 0 is






, and f (u)0 on [u1,0]. Ã
Step 2. In the solution to the system (19)–(22),  > 0, which implies that the original
solution y is strictly convex.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., suppose   0. Then f 0(u) = eu  1 < 0, which implies that
f (^ u)< f (u1)=0. But f (^ u)=(e ^ u  1)  ^ u + = ¾0, contradiction. So >0.
Since




>0 (or  <
13
6 ) implies that the original solution y is strictly convex. Ã

















8k. But then y() does not satisfy the differential equation in system (13), a contradiction.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Nonlinear pricing and competition 147
Step 3. Given  (or ^ ), a solution for u (and hence y) exists and is unique.
Proof. Since f 00(u) = eu > 0, f is strictly convex (with f (1) = 1). Hence f (u) >
0 on (u1,0]. We have f 0(u) = eu   1 = 0 ) umin =  ln. Let A() := min f (u) =
f ( ln)=ln+
3
4(2  2). Since f (u1)=0, we must have A()0.
We next show that A() < 0. Suppose not. Then u1 = umin =  ln < 0, which





















(1  ^ )<1. (23)
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(   ^ )

for  2[^ ,1]. (24)
Thus given ^ , u (and hence y) is uniquely determined by (24). Ã
It remains to show that ^  (or ) exists and is unique.
Step 4. In the solution,  2[1,minf0,2=
p
3kg) (where 0 is deﬁned below).
Proof. Since  ln = umin < u1 < 0, we have  > 1 or  <
3
















such that A(0) = 0. Since A() < 0, we thus have
 2 [1,0). Combining this with  < 2=
p
3k, in the solution to the system (19)–(22) we
must have  2[1,minf0,2=
p
3kg). Ã
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Proof. First, f    + u +  = eu implies (f    + u + )0 = f    + u + . That is,
f 0   f   u = constant = f 0(u1)   f (u1)   u1 = f 0(u1)   u1. Hence f 0   f   (u   u1) =


























































fore, () is continuous in .
First, consider  ! 1+. It is easily veriﬁed that  ! 0+ and  ! (
7
4) . Hence f (u) !
g(u)=
7











k, we have ()<2=
p
k for  sufﬁciently close to 1+.
Second, consider  ! b = minf0,2=
p













is due to (25)).
0 2=
p
3k: For  ! b  =  
0 , A() = fmin ! 0  (since A(0) = 0). So u1 ! ( ln)+,
and by (25), ()!1. So when  !b , ()>2=
p
k.
By the mean-value theorem, there exists  2 (1,minf0,2=
p




Step 6. The solution in Step 5 is unique.
Proof. We have
f (u1)=(eu1  1) u1 + =0. (28)







































































































































Therefore () is strictly increasing in  2 (1,minf0,2=
p
3kg), which implies that
there is a unique  satisfying ()=2=
p
k. Ã
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose M  D. Since ^ D   D = ^ M   M =
p
k=3,




From the quality provision schedule in the full coverage range under monopoly,
q0
M()=2>0 for  2[^ M, ^ D]











In equilibrium, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt from a type  consumer is positive for  > D, i.e.
y 0  y  
1
2y 02 >0, hence
q0
M()=2>q0
D() for  2[^ D,1]. (30)






implies ^ D < 1. Combining this with (29) and (30) we have
qM(1)>qD(1), which contradicts the fact thatqM(1)=qD(1)=1. Therefore M >D in
equilibrium.
To show that qD()>qM(), we consider the following cases.150 Yang and Ye Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
 For  2[D, ^ D], by the quality provision schedules in the partial coverage range
we have qD()>qM() as D <M.
 For  2 (^ D, ^ M], qD() >qD(^ D) =
p




 For  2(^ M,1), q0
D()<2=q0
M() and qM(1)=qD(1) imply that qD()>qM().
To sum up, qD() > qM(), hence   qD() <   qM() for  2 [D,1), which implies
that quality distortion is smaller in the duopoly case. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The following lemma is needed in the proof.
Lemma 2. Suppose A, B, C, D, C0 and D0 are all strictly positive, with D0 > D and A=B <
C=D <C0=D0. Then (A +C)=(B +D)<(A +C0)=(B +D0).
Proof. We ﬁrst show that for  > 0, (A +C)=(B +D) is strictly increasing in . To


















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from D0 > D and the second inequality follows from
C=D <C0=D0. 
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since qM() is strictly increasing. Thus in view of Lemma 2, to prove EqD > EqM it is








Note that qD(^ D) = qM(^ M), qD(1) = qM(1), and qM() is linear. Let qL() be a linear


















Note thatqD() is concave for  2(^ D,1). To see this, differentiating (12) with respect to
, we have
q00 =y 000 = 
2
k
(  y 0)y 00 <0
since y 00 > 0 and   y 0 > 0 for  2 (^ D,1). The concavity of qD() implies that qD() >
qL() for any  2(^ D,1). Therefore, the inequality (32) holds. 
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